TOP SECRET

23 May 1961

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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South Korea: South Korea's revolutionary government is still consolidating its power and neutralizing elements which might oppose it. Colonel Kim Chong-pil, who is reported to be the principal adviser of the coup strongman, Major General Pak Chong-hui, told an American official on 22 May that everyone involved in the new regime has been too busy with internal affairs to pay much attention to relationships with the United States. He asserted that the United States should not be concerned, since the revolutionary leadership was anti-Communist and pro-US. The officer said that this was true despite the resentment engendered by statements of American officials in Seoul on 16 May, which had urged support of the former Chang Myon government The adviser to Pak admitted that military command principles in relation to the UN Command had been violated, but said that the intent was to make the relationship between South Korean military forces and the UN Command as close as in

Interservice rivalries and tension between the senior and the more numerous junior officers of the revolutionary leadership are continuing. The marines and paratroops in Seoul are reported to have refused on 21 May to obey an order by Chang To-vong to return to their camps

the past. He said the leadership feels that Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Chang To-yong has too many duties in the present arrangement—he is chairman of the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction, head of the cabinet, and minister of defense—and that a new chief of staff should be ap-

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DAILY BRIEF

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| insurgent activities separatist move gained moments year. These mother, are suspirecruits from the government | Ithough there has been an over ity during the past decade, the ements in the eastern part of t am since U Nu resumed the pr lovements, which have no stro bected by Rangoon of having ob he evacuating Chinese National t reportedly is now planning to hem, despite the onset of the r | Shah and Karen the country have emiership last ong ties with each otained arms and list irregulars. o expand its cam- | 25X1 |
| munities remainedly seeking are the Cypriot Agriculties facing Foundation been compounded labor movement workers' repressionated by the Copersonality who ence. | elations between the Greek and n strained, with activists on hims and preparing for a possible reements which established the colitical problems, and chronic resident Makarios' government of by a deteriorating situation to the Communist was recently sentative in the Cypriot delegated in the Cypriot delegated and all labor organization of the communists elected as its head appears to be falling under Cyprior to the Cyprior of the Cyprior | ooth sides report- le breakdown of e present govern- e economic diffi- nt, have recently in the organized c chosen as the ation to the June zation. Simulta- not already domi an ineffective communist influ- | 25X1 |
| security precau white strikes an heavily infiltrate workers to stay the Union's asso ernment, which al European lead ings, on 19 May 26 June. Four units have been | ations as a result of a continuind demonstrations. An interted by Communists, has called a thome on 29 and 30 May, in the earlier had ordered several aders to refrain from attending imposed a sweeping ban on a militia units and a number of called up, and arrests of Blarobably total more than a thou | ng threat of non- racial committee d on non-European n protest against 31 May. The gov- non-white and liber- g political gather- ull meetings until Citizen Force ck Africans in the | OΚ |
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
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| | Apprehension appears to be growing among civilians who originally supported the coup or were apathetic to the overthrow | |
| | of the Chang Myon government over the adoption of increasingly repressive tactics by the revolutionary leaders. | 25X |
| 5X1 | but it is unclear how many are hoodlums and criminals and how | 25/ |
| | many are political offenders. Most newspapers have been forced to adopt a position of complete endorsement of the new regime | |
| | and give a distorted picture of American reaction implying that Washington supports the revolution. | |
| | Meanwhile, new Foreign Minister Kim Hong-il appears | |
| | to be attempting to allay American concern regarding the | |
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| | 23 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BILLIETIN Dogg 2 | |

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revolutionary government. At his first press conference Kim gave assurances that the new government's foreign policy will not differ basically from that of the Chang Myon administration. He added that negotiations would be continued for the normalization of South Korean - Japanese relations and that the new regime opposed the "march North" unification policy of the old Rhee government. Kim is a former South Korean ambassador to Nationalist China and a retired lieutenant general. He is believed to be strongly anti-Communist and to favor an authoritarian government similar to that of Chiang Kai-shek on Taiwan.

| Peiping's People's Daily, in an editorial of 21 May, claims |
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| the US 'stage-managed the coup' and labels the coup leaders |
| "fascist." Pyongyang has broadcast reports of atrocities al- |
| legedly perpetrated by US personnel and has depicted the |
| coup as a US-sponsored effort to "force more unbearable |
| calamities on the South Korean people." |
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23 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page

Burmese Army to Extend Its Anti-Insurgent Campaign

Insurgency in Burma stems primarily from the dislike and distrust of the ethnic minorities in the Burmese highlands for the Burman-dominated government. These groups joined the Burmese Union reluctantly when the British granted independence in 1948, and the largest minority elements, the Shans, Karens, Kayahs, and Kachins, insisted on separate states drawn along ethnic lines as the price of participation. Since then Rangoon's "Burmanization" policies and the arbitrary actions of army personnel in the hill country have built up the minority peoples' distaste for the Burmans. In addition to Shan and Karen demands for independence, the non-insurgent Chin and Arakanese communities--and even the Mons, who are almost entirely absorbed into other ethnic groups-are demanding statehood for themselves, and the combined minority communities, under the leadership of Burma's former President Sao Shwe Thaike (a Shan prince), are proposing a looser federal structure for the Union government.

Except among the Shans and Karens, antigovernment military action has been largely brought under control. The Communist forces which revolted in 1947 and 1948 have been reduced to the status of bandits. The evacuation to Taiwan of over 4,000 Chinese irregulars in April has left a relatively small force of about 1,200 in the country along the Burmese-Thai border. Many of these, although they still reject Burmese authority, appear anxious to merge quietly with the local populace. However, as of early April the Burmese Foreign Office reported that some 500 irregulars had joined the Karen National Defense Organization, and since that time press reports of army skirmishes have suggested that Chinese irregulars are collaborating with the insurgents?

Following General Ne Win's retirement from the prime ministership in April 1960, military pressure against the insurgents slackened appreciably. Troops were diverted to the China border area on survey and demarcation missions and, later, to the joint campaign with the Chinese Communists against the Chinese Nationalist irregulars. Many of the army's senior?

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| 25X1 | officers, who had opposed the return of civilian government, lost their enthusiasm for the struggle against the insurgents. The Shan and Karen insurgents took advantage of this respite to regroup and have recently launched strong attacks against government-held towns and the Rangoon-Mandalay railway. The commitment of six of the army's 13 infantry brigades to the suppression of these marauding bands underscores the | |
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| | government's concern with the deterioration of internal security. However, unless these units are prepared to operate through the rainy season as they did during General Ne Win's administration, the campaign is likely to have little lasting effect. | 25X1 |
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Cyprus

The two basic political problems between the Greek and Turkish communities stem from their leaders' disagreement on implementation of provisions in the Cyprus constitution calling for a 7:3 ratio between Greeks and Turks in the civil service and for separate municipalities for the Turks in the island's five largest cities. The stalemate has caused a sense of frustration within the Turkish community which could lead to more active hostility against the Greek Cypriot majority. Rumors that members of both communities are smuggling and storing arms and that underground organizations are being formed are causing nervousness.

The murder on 13 May of a British citizen in Kyrenia and the subsequent arrest of a former leader of the Greek Cypriot organization EOKA have heightened tension. Both Makarios and the minister of interior, himself a former EOKA leader, immediately denounced the murder. The possibility exists that the act was designed by intransigent former EOKA elements to embarrass the more moderate government.

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Meanwhile, the government is plagued with substantial unemployment and is seeking funds in Britain and the United States for development programs. According to a Greek Cypriot weekly newspaper, the government may seek a loan from the USSR if unsuccessful in negotiations with the West.

The Communists appear to be on the verge of taking over the labor movement. The largest federation on the island is Communist dominated, and it now appears likely that the only other significant Greek Cypriot federation will fall under Communist domination or will break into small competing factions. The anti-Communists within the federation and the government were unable to cooperate in supporting an anti-Communist candidate.

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The Deputy Secretary of Defense

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The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

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